Many in the West believe that the Islam practiced in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia holds the best chance of defeating jihadi ideology, because of the strength of its clerics and their proximity to militant Salafis, who espouse jihad and support the movement. But such alliances for strategic gain could easily turn to backfire against the West, as it has before.
At first glance, an Islamic movement relentlessly arguing against jihad would appear to be an ideal ally for the United States in the war on terrorism. Even more appealing, the movement claims to be the modern-day heirs of the Salafi movement and is prolific in issuing condemnations of fellow Salafis who have engaged in organized resistance or encouraged individuals to heed the call of jihad. Clearly, there are many potential dangers in creating such an alliance in order to weaken the global jihadi movement. Yet, in many ways it is occurring ipso facto through the U.S. partnership with Saudi Arabia and the powerful positions held by Salafi clerics in the kingdom. U.S. support for this movement—whether direct or indirect—should be reevaluated in consideration of the waning influence of the Saudi Salafis both inside and outside of the kingdom, and the resulting long and short term effects on U.S. counterterrorism efforts.
The fundamentalist rhetoric of Saudi Salafis (commonly referred to as Wahhabis) has been the subject of debate in Washington since September 11. Less frequently discussed is that this same movement also produces a significant amount of literature aimed at impugning the Islamic credentials of Salafi-jihadis and organized Islamist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood. In strategic terms, the alliance with a pro-Western Saudi Arabia benefits the U.S. twofold, as it also indirectly supports the Saudi Salafis and their attempt to purify Salafi ideology—the main driver of Islamic extremism—from jihadi tendencies. However, the alliance may prove detrimental as the public image and legitimacy of the Saudi Salafis continues to decline in Muslim eyes.
Osama bin Laden and countless other mujahidin, as well as Muslim reformers, have turned against the Saudi Salafi movement—which oversees the religious and educational institutions in Saudi Arabia—yet it has remained loyal to the kingdom and its policy of cooperation with the U.S. This, coupled with the decadence of Saudi rulers, has made for an extremely unpopular image in the Muslim world, not just among supporters of the mujahidin. The U.S. must not rule out the possibility that Saudi Salafis may continue to lose influence to the point that Salafis advocating resistance to the tyrannical forces of the West could consolidate the movement and present a unified Salafi doctrine on jihad. Such a scenario would be a significant blow to U.S. efforts to de-legitimize the global jihadi movement, and could serve as a very public loss in the long term struggle against the patron ideology of the mujahidin.
The main catalyst of the decline of the Saudi Salafis came in the late 1990s with the death of three of their most prolific and well-known leaders (Bin Baz, al-Albani, and al-Uthaymin). They were the leaders of the committees issuing fatwas, or religious rulings, controlling the two holiest sites in Islam, and overseeing the curriculum of the most prestigious Salafi universities. Since then, their successors have attempted to preserve their legacy, treating them as the highest scholarly authorities in doctrinal and ideological issues. But no new leaders have risen to fill their shoes, and Salafi leaders outside the kingdom are now the ones capturing an audience and defining the ideology of the movement.
The ineffective and often pedantic tactics of the Saudi Salafi movement are a major factor in their decline. They ceaselessly refute their detractors; the “innovators” who have adopted the methods of “deviant sects” and are thus leading the Muslim community into sectarianism and discord. Yet, the rancorous rhetoric used to attack these “innovators”—many of whom are among the most popular Islamic leaders—seems to have little resonance among most Muslims. Because many Muslims lack the rigorous classical education needed to parse through the minutia of Saudi Salafi arguments, their condemnations of jihadists often prove unapproachable or unappealing. Thus, Saudi Salafis obsess over religious doctrine and practice while offering little guidance on political or social affairs in a time of great upheaval in the Muslim world.
Their failure to address issues of concern to the Muslim nation is exemplified in the networks of English-language Salafi websites, which are aimed primarily at American and British audiences. Salafitalk.net supports the positions of the Saudi Salafi movement, hosting a discussion forum, links web-broadcasts lectures from Saudi scholars and providing extensive refutations of innovators and deviants. Over the past four years, they have posted hundreds of articles on Abul-Hasan al-Ma’ribi, a little known figure outside of volitile northern Yemen and Saudi Salafi circles. The massive number of condemnations and refutations against al-Ma’ribi point to the Saudi Salafis’ fear of defection, especially from those who attempt to mobilize Islamic resistance—the greatest threat to stability in the kingdom. But devoting such resources to de-legitimizing an individual ideology (literally hundreds of detailed refutations of every aspect of al-Ma’ribi’s ideology have been published) has not yielded results for the Saudi Salafis. Instead, more charismatic leaders have been able to win support with simpler messages addressing Muslims’ greatest concerns—bin Laden being the best example.
It seems apparent that the Saudi Salafi campaign against Salafi-jihadi ideology is having little effect on the morale or public image of the mujahidin. For the very reason that Saudi Salafis have built their movement around the illegitimacy and deviancy of social or political mobilization in Islam makes them an ineffective organization for countering militancy. Without public campaigns that address key societal and political issues, Saudi Salafis are left only to continue the seemingly endless ideological and doctrinal debates with Salafi-jihadis and other figures oppose them, who in turn eventually focus their energies on winning supporters and strengthening their movements rather than wasting resources to convince Saudi Salafis that their methods are sound.
Indirect support for an ineffective religious movement may seem benign, but the consequences of its failure are not. Abul-Hasan al-Ma’ribi and the numerous others condemned or excommunicated by the Saudi Salafi movement continue to lecture, publish and organize Muslims around a more persuasive call of unity and collective action. Additionally, although the Saudi Salafis are able to issue textually elaborate materials condemning jihadi ideology, their methods of scholarship are not shared by the majority of Sunni scholars, and the language of their arguments are far too detailed for the lay reader.
Over recent decades, the prestige Saudi Salafis enjoy from ruling Mecca and Medina has won the trust of the average Muslim. But if the current trend of the last five years continues, Saudi Salafis will undoubtedly lose power and in all likelihood an alternate current of either jihadist of Islamic reform-minded Salafis will replace them. U.S. policymakers should not underestimate the importance of Mecca and Medina to organized Islamic movements. If it is indeed the case that these most important and holy cities are lost to supporters or sympathizers of global jihad, the U.S. will be forced to fight a far greater ideological backing for the mujahidin and face a tide with sweeping momentum in the Middle East.
Published By Waajihatul Islaamiyyah (The Islamic Front)
Email: waajihatulislaamiyyah@gmail.com
Tel: 1 (868) 787-0765/365-6253
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